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vocabulary are explicitly explained.
However, López-Guerra does sometimes fail
to clarify terms. Throughout the book, he
refers to “good” and “bad” electoral choices
and outcomes. For example, on page 32 it is
stated that “a well-informed electorate
would make the incidence of bad electoral
results less likely.” What is meant by a “bad
electoral result” is not explained. The reader
is left to wonder whether he is referring to an
outcome that is morally or democratically
“bad”, such as a dictatorial party gaining
power, or simply an outcome ill-suited to
the interests of the majority of the popula-
tion. Two more examples are from page 64:
“make bad choices” and “the best option on
the ballot”. The best option on the ballot
could be the option that would most repre-
sent the electors’ individual interests, the in-
terests of their age cohort, or the interests of
the population, depending on from which
concern we consider the term “best”. Alter-
natively, it could also be the least corrupt
 option. 
Occasionally, some clarification of these am-
biguities is offered. When considering the
potential voting tendencies of children,
López-Guerra suggests that a poor choice
from a minor might be “inappropriate from
the perspective of an uncontroversial nor-
mative standard”. Yet he also argues that
even a choice which is inappropriate on
these grounds is not “dismissible ex ante as
clearly unacceptable”, without explaining
why.
A further criticism is that the book’s pro-
posals sometimes lack detail. This is deliber-
ate: the author states on page 25 that if he
were to “present a detailed version of the lot-
tery, chances are few people would accept
it.” His goal is only to convince his readers
that the enfranchisement lottery is morally
acceptable, not to implement it, so it is un-
derstandable that he does not want to dis-
suade people on the basis of the finer points.
This deliberate vagueness, however, can be
frustrating. Some of the important issues not
tackled are the size of the group of electors,
the method of gathering a random sample
of the population, and what the compe-
tence-building process would involve.
López-Guerra asks us to consider the en-
franchisement lottery under the most
favourable conditions, but it might be help-
ful to know how and if it is possible that
these conditions could come to exist. 
López-Guerra argues his case passionately;
his arguments are balanced. He considers
objections to all of his proposals and argu-
ments and admits to their failings. In chap-
ter two, for example, he admits that
potential undesirable corruptive effects may
be strong enough to reject the lottery, and
that the enfranchisement lottery is less trans-
parent than the current system of universal
suffrage. The book incorporates literature
from around the world and from many dif-
ferent disciplines, including history, philos-
ophy and political science. However, the
referencing is clumsy, and there are some
mistakes in the bibliography (Beckmann,
Calvino, Daniels, Hariss, Holyoake, Kahne-
man).
Claudio López-Guerra (2014): Democracy
and Disenfranchisement: The Morality of Elec-
toral Exclusions. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 189 pages. ISBN: 978-0198705789.
Price: £50.
andemore’s new book argues that
democracy, the form of rule in
Western nations, is valuable based
on the idea of collective intelligence. It pres-
ents arguments supporting the collective in-
telligence of the people, which Landemore
calls “Democratic Reason”. The book aims
to convince readers, including those who
may not share Western faith in democracy,
that democracy epistemically outperforms
any form of non-democratic rule. The book
has eight chapters, a conclusion, an index
and a bibliography. 
In the introductory chapter, Landemore in-
troduces the very concept of democracy,
which she defines as “an inclusive decision
making procedure” (10). The author dis-
cusses the originality of her book, which
stems from her original argument that ex-
plicitly connects the epistemic properties of
a liberal society and those of democratic de-
cision-making procedures. Landemore states
her intention to defend “collective intelli-
gence” in favour of democracy, on the basis
that with collective intelligence comes “cog-
nitive diversity” (the existence of different
ways of seeing the world (5)), a property
which she attributes to good political deci-
sions. She illustrates her epistemic argument
for democracy with an applied maze model. 
Chapter two illustrates the notion of the
only-recent acceptance of democracy in the
Western world. It considers the deep-seated
anti-democratic prejudice shared by many
contemporary political philosophers against
the rule of the “dumb many”, and provides
four positive and four epistemic reproaches
to such prejudice. The positive reproaches
are that citizens are irrational, citizens are ap-
athetic, citizens are ignorant, and democratic
decisions are impossible and meaningless.
Turning now to the normative approaches,
Landemore considers the elitist theories of
democracy, the participatory theories of
democracy, the deliberative theories of
democracy, and finally epistemic theories.
Also in chapter two, the author carries out a
critical literature survey focusing on work by
José Luis Martí (2006) and David Estlund
(2008), among other democratic theorists.
The author continues to think critically
about other work in the third chapter, which
is dedicated to a history of ideas about col-
lective intelligence. Landemore distinguishes
two mechanisms for the production of col-
lective intelligence: deliberation and aggre-
gation. She separates the historical thinkers
into two groups according to these mecha-
nisms: “talkers”, who have deduced that
democratic reason is a function of individual
reason, and “counters”, who focus on the
epistemic properties of judgement aggrega-
tion involving large numbers of people.
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However, rather than grouping together his-
torical ideas accordingly, she provides a tra-
ditional chronological history of ideas
beginning with Protagoras’ (arguably) first
epistemic argument, and considering
thought from several time, spatial and cul-
tural perspectives.
Over the following four chapters, which
comprise the empirical part of the book, the
author draws upon and exploits Hong and
Page’s investigations, which establish the
claim that cognitive diversity is, in many
cases, more important than individual abil-
ity. In the fourth chapter, which continues
the history of ideas, Landemore presents her
original argument for why inclusive deliber-
ation is epistemically greater than less-inclu-
sive deliberation. She clarifies the meanings
of, and discusses, the various types of delib-
eration including individual, collective, clas-
sical and inclusive deliberation, and
discusses whether voting is a necessary com-
plement of deliberation or a sign of its short-
comings. The theoretical epistemic qualities
of deliberation are presented and illustrated
with concrete examples. The author also
demonstrates her support for the “Diversity
Trumps Ability Theorem” developed by
Hong and Page; the idea that “a randomly
selected collection of problem solvers out-
performs a collection of the best individual
problem solvers” (102). Finally, she suggests
and discusses the respective advantages of
three different ways to ensure cognitive di-
versity: random lotteries, citizen assemblies,
and deliberative polls.
Chapter five focuses on the objections to the
idea that democratic deliberation has epis-
temic properties. The chapter is split into
two sections. In the first part of the chapter,
the author acknowledges problems raised in
objections to her argument and proposes so-
lutions to such problems. The second part is
dedicated to a theoretical response to the
empirical challenge to the epistemic proper-
ties of deliberation, which the author devel-
oped in collaboration with Hugo Mercier:
the new psychological “Argumentative The-
ory of Reasoning”, which theorises that the
aim of reasoning is to find and evaluate rea-
sons “so that individuals can convince other
people and evaluate their arguments” (124).
Chapter six addresses three accounts of the
epistemic properties of judgement aggrega-
tion through majority rule, each of which
suggests a general epistemic inferiority of
pure judgement aggregation compared with
pure deliberation. Landemore argues that
majority rule is task specific and should be
seen both as a way of settling on a collective
decision when time is of the essence for de-
liberation and, thanks to the notion of col-
lective intelligence, as a way of turning
imperfect individual predictions into accu-
rate collective ones (146). This, the author
argues, makes majority rule a supplement to,
and not a rival of, deliberation. There are
three appendixes to chapter six. The first in-
volves graphs to illustrate how the probabil-
ity that a majority is right rises as the
number of voters increases. The second il-
lustrates how group predictive competence
emerges from negatively correlated judge-
ments with an example adapted from Hong
and Page, and the final appendix gives in-
formation on information markets, a mar-
ket-based procedure for aggregating the
wisdom of crowds. Landemore defends her
decision to include this final appendix on
the basis that they are interesting, although
they are not an alternative to majority rule.
The seventh chapter focuses on the objec-
tions to the claimed epistemic properties of
majority rule and claimed epistemic judge-
ments. Section one is dedicated to a general
objection to the epistemic approach to vot-
ing because it fails to take seriously the idea
that politics is about the aggregation of
ideas. Section two deals with the problem of
informational free riding and the voting par-
adox, and finally section three refutes that
citizens suffer from systematic biases which
are multiplied at the collective level.
Chapter eight is concerned with political
cognitivism. Landemore attempts to con-
vince the reader that the idea that there are
right or wrong answers to some political
questions and that the right answers can be
deduced, or at least approximated, by a po-
litical decision mechanism is at least plausi-
ble. The chapter distinguishes between weak
(a decision is good as long as it avoids major
harms) and strong (more substantive) polit-
ical cognitivism, as well as culturalist and
universal political cognitivism, and considers
the implications of each of these different
types. It presents Philip Tetler’s attempt to
quantify good political judgement, explain-
ing his experiment and results. However, it
also considers the anti-authoritarian objec-
tion to political cognitivism.
The author concludes her book by returning
to the maze model of the introductory chap-
ter and considering its limits in greater de-
tail. There are, according to Landemore,
good theoretical reasons that the rule of
many is better than the rule of the few, and
there is a lack of evidence to suggest that
democracies do systematically worse than
other regimes which would be needed to re-
fute the claim that democracy is the smartest
form of rule, although it would be good to
support the epistemic argument with em-
pirical proof connecting existing democracy
and valued outcomes. She iterates the pre-
conditions of democratic reason: cognitive
diversity, liberalism, and a liberal and dem-
ocratic education. Democratic reason must
be distributed across time as well as space in
order for it to include the ability of people to
learn from the past, and democracies must
thus have institutions to store knowledge
and memory.
The number of concrete examples which
Landemore uses to demonstrate almost
every abstract term, such as the maze model
she uses to illustrate the epistemic argument
for democracy, makes for interesting reading
and assists understanding. However, the au-
thor assumes a certain level of background
knowledge from her readers, and her lack of
definition or explanation of some compli-
cated concepts could make the book quite
inaccessible for a reader without an in-depth
knowledge of the subject.
The book is well-organised in many ways,
for example in that it has helpful headings
and sub-headings, and that each chapter is
summarised in its introduction and has a
conclusion; however, sometimes the way the
author chooses to lay out her ideas detracts
from ease of chronological reading. In chap-
ter six, readers are invited to read chapter
eight for a defence of “moral facts”, which
are discussed and applied to quite a signifi-
cant effect prior to the defence of such ap-
plication (146). Similarly, on page 152, the
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author refers to “incompetent-pace con-
trived rational choice theory predictions
(which I also address in the next chapter),” a
fairly abstract principle which could have
perhaps been better explained fully at first
encounter.
The book strives to be balanced throughout.
Landemore considers various counterargu-
ments to each of her assertions or beliefs,
which, when rebutted, add to the strength
of her own argument. However, she does not
always elaborate or counter such counterar-
guments. For example, on page 39, Lande-
more argues “in spite of ”, not counter to,
Sunstein’s assertion that all groups will have
some kind of exchange of opinion and are
thus deliberative. She does, however, admit
to the limits of her supporting arguments:
for example, on page 66, that Aristotle and
Machiavelli do not explain what makes
them confident about alleged immunity of
groups to passions, compared with single
rulers or princes.
In chapter four, the author states that “rep-
resentative democracy so far remains the
only option for our mass societies” (90).
However, this assumption is not referenced
or supported, and is something that may be
disputed, particularly outside of the West-
ern world and even within it. For example,
Claudio López-Guerra’s book Democracy
and Disenfranchisement (2014) is dedicated
to convincing readers of the plausibility of
an election process not involving universal
suffrage and is a response to many works on
the topic of universal suffrage taking for
granted that voting is a universal and fun-
damental right.
Hélène Landemore (2013): Democratic Rea-
son. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 279
pages. ISBN 978-0691155654. Price: £27.95
he anthology Youth Quotas and
other Efficient Forms of Youth Par-
ticipation in Ageing Societies deals,
as the title suggests, with the challenge of de-
mographic change in Western countries and
its implications for the youth. One of the
main questions is how the participation of
young people may be supported and se-
cured. Eleven articles, including introduc-
tion and afterword, discuss possible ways to
increase young people’s presence in elections,
as well as in public offices, and the problems
that come with this. The main topic, youth
quotas, has not been discussed much before
– neither in politics nor in scholarly debates.
In this work, the authors approach forms of
participation from the point of view of dif-
ferent disciplines including political science,
philosophy and sociology. 
The introduction to the book lays out the
general problems that are created by an age-
ing society. In addition, some definitions –
for example for different types of quotas –
are given. These clarifications ease the reader
into the topic of youth quotas and provide a
useful background when reading the other
contributions. The anthology then presents
some of the issues concerning youth partic-
ipation. While quotas are the main topic of
the first few articles, some other forms of
youth participation receive a discussion as
well. In this brief summary, three articles, by
Juliana Bidadanure, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer,
and Marcel Wissenburg, will be omitted,
since they are reprinted in this journal (al-
beit in shortened versions).
In the first article, What Do Quotas Do? Re-
flections on the Ubiquity and Justice of Quotas,
Radostin Kaloianov explains the purpose of
quotas in general and only touches on the
topic of youth quotas lightly. Kaloianov lists
arguments for and against quotas, while say-
ing that they have become a vital part of our
society. Whenever a choice between people
has to be made, quotas are applied. This is
described as meritocratic allocation (8),
Kaloianov’s first dimension of quotas. The
second is a formal quota which can be im-
plemented for normative reasons. He argues
that such quotas for the disadvantaged can
improve justice in their treatment. By means
of such a quota, equal opportunities for dif-
ferent groups of people can be created (10). 
Many opponents of a normative quota, ac-
cording to Kaloianov, argue that candidates
for certain positions are not as qualified as
others because of their age or race. This way,
the merit principle prevalent in our society,
i.e., the already existing quota, impedes mi-
norities from being successful because of
their discriminated-against attributes. This
so-called “meritocracy” implies the margin-
alisation of certain groups of people in our
society and preserves the asymmetrical
power relations and oppression. A formal
quota would neutralise these tendencies and
prejudices and make positions available to
people irrespective of their background.
Kaloianov then briefly examines the imple-
mentation of a youth quota. He concludes
Jörg Tremmel/Antony Mason/Petter Haakenstad Godli/Igor 
Dimitrijoski (eds.): Youth Quotas and other Efficient Forms of
Youth Participation in Ageing Societies 
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